


# Trustworthiness-centric Software Supply Chain Security

Regulations, Requirements & Solutions



Dr. Xin Qiu, Dr. James Ni, Dr. Lisa Yin

COMMScope®

# About CommScope



Dr. Xin Qiu has over 25 years of experience in Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), device, and software security, holding a portfolio of 80+ patents.

Sr. Director at CommScope PKI Center & Security Solutions:

I lead a diverse team in R&D, security operations, and product marketing, delivering security services to global device manufacturers and network operators.



# Agenda

Typical Threats in Software Supply Chain (SSC)

Emerging Government Regulations and Industry Initiatives

Fundamentals of Software Supply Chain Security


CommScope Solution for SSC Security

Collaborative Solutions from JFrog and CommScope (demo)


Forward Looking: Post-Quantum Code Signing

Conclusions

# Software Supply Chain (SSC)



# Typical Threats in Software Supply Chain



# Emerging Government Regulations

## United States




Globally, **new laws and regulations** are being enforced to require stronger measures for software supply chain security and application security.

## Securing the Software Supply Chain: Recommended Practices for Managing Open-Source Software and Software Bill of Materials

**Code Signing Requirement:** Suppliers must perform code signing for all software/firmware delivered to customers & partners, to ensure security & integrity.

**Risk Mitigation:** Any gaps in code signing processes can expose customers to malicious or counterfeit components, damaging the supplier's brand, reputation, and business.





# Industry Consortia and Initiatives



## Software Trustworthiness Best Practices

[https://www.iiconsortium.org/pdf/Software\\_Trustworthiness\\_Best\\_Practices\\_Whitepaper\\_2020\\_03\\_23.pdf](https://www.iiconsortium.org/pdf/Software_Trustworthiness_Best_Practices_Whitepaper_2020_03_23.pdf)



## Safeguarding artifact integrity across any software supply chain

[SLSA • Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts](#)



## The Trusted Services project provides a framework for developing and deploying device Root Of Trust (RoT)

<https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/trusted-services>



## PKI Consortium Best Practices for Code Signing

<https://about.signpath.io/product/pkic-best-practices>



## SOFTWARE QUALITY STANDARDS – ISO 5055

<https://www.it-cisq.org/standards/code-quality-standards/>



## Scaling Up Supply Chain Security: Seamless Container Image Signing

<https://openssf.org/blog/2024/02/16/scaling-up-supply-chain-security-implementing-sigstore-for-seamless-container-image-signing/>



## Creating the Complete Trusted Computing Ecosystem: An Overview of the Trusted Software Stack (TSS) 2.0

<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/creating-complete-trusted-computing-ecosystem-overview-trusted-software-stack-tss-2-0/>



# Fundamentals of Software Supply Chain Security

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## Institutional Trust and Confidence

- Establishing trust and confidence in software's integrity among all stakeholders.

## Software Lifecycle

- Addressing risks and weaknesses through a rigorous process of software design, development, testing, validation and deployment

## Software Operation

- Maintaining the integrity of software-at-rest and software-in-operation.


## Software Protection

- Protecting software from unauthorized access and tampering.




# Basics: Software Integrity – Levels of Trust

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# Basics: Software Integrity via Code Signing



# Ensuring Trustworthiness in Code Signing

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
## Signing and Verifications Keys

- Code signing without signing key protection leaves doors open to malicious injection threats
- Code signing without chaining verification key to a root of trust increases vulnerability to man-in-middle attacks

## Signers and Signing Activities

- Lack of signer verification diminishes confidence in the integrity of the code
- Absence of signer activity tracking hinders accountability, undermining trust and the integrity of the signing process

# A Trust Framework for Code Signing in SSC



Sign

Common Root of Trust Under a Certificate Authority (CA)

Verify



# CommScope's Code Signing Platform

CommScope's Solution: PRISM (Permission Rights Signing Manager)

**Code Signing**  
Encryption, Obfuscation



**Fortify Your Software Against Malicious Actors**  
**Build Trust for Your Applications!**

## AUTHENTICATION

Ensure software originates from a trusted source & detect unauthorized modifications

## CONFIDENTIALITY

Hide software implementation & protect sensitive information against IP theft and reverse engineering


## NON-REPUDIATION

Ensure accountability of developers or publishers & protect against insider attacks

## USER TRUST

Instill confidence and trust in users through verified, secure software applications

# CommScope's Code Signing Flow



Term: HSM – Hardware Security Module





# Software Verification



*how to prevent sophisticated attackers from bypassing code authentication?*

Follows a chain-of-trust model:

- Boot -> platform -> application
- Secure boot code & the root verification key are protected by **hardware**, establishing a root of trust (RoT) as the foundation.
- Later stage verification keys can vary and be updated for different reasons

Employs isolated execution environments to separate secure & non-secure operations.

Supports mechanisms for rollback protection, and anti-tampering measures.



# Key Protection Gap in Vendor Secure Boot Solutions

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Chip vendors often provide secure boot reference code with specifications but leave the responsibility of protecting software signing keys to device makers.

The reference code typically uses **software-based key** storage, which can be vulnerable if device makers do not implement robust key protection measures.



CommScope's extensive experience in implementing bootloader signing **with HSM-protected keys** for a wide range of chip vendors:

STMicroelectronics, Texas Instruments, Broadcom, Qualcomm, HiSilicon, Xilinx, MaxLinear, MediaTek, and Intel.

# Signing Key Management

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## Signing key creation:

- All signing keys are generated centrally by the Certificate Authority (CA), not by individual signers.
- Signing keys are created through a multi-party controlled key ceremony.


## Signing key in operations:

- All signing keys are deployed to FIPS 140-2 compliant Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) hosted in PRiSM.
- Access to the backups of all signing keys is required by Two-Party Integrity (TPI) and is restricted to a list of trusted personnel

## Signing key access permission:


- All signing keys are associated with an enterprise, product family, and/or specific application as part of the signing configuration.
- Each code signer is assigned permissions to access one or more signing keys and configurations
- Every access and use of a signing key by a signer is logged to ensure non-repudiation.

# The JFrog Platform



Source: <https://jfrog.com/platform/>

# JFrog and CommScope Integrated Solution



# How This Solution Helps JFrog's Customers

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- Protect your SSC from unauthorized access to signing keys and avoid irreversible security risks.
- Enable robust security measures without significant investment in technical expertise or infrastructure to meet industry standards and regulations.
- Access a pre-integrated solution that simplifies implementation, reducing your development efforts.

Let us handle the complexity and cost, while you benefit from simplicity, productivity, and enhanced security.




# Forward Looking: Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)

*An Upcoming Major Security Event*

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- With quantum computers, current public-key algorithms for code signing, like RSA and ECDSA, face significant vulnerabilities.
- Similar to Y2K, the impending "Y2Q" crisis is projected to occur between 2030 and 2035.
- Risk is now: "Harvest" encrypted data today, decrypt it after "Q-Day"
- NIST released the first set of PQC standards in August 2024.



As a first step, code-signing software itself needs to be migrated to PQC.

# Forward Looking: PQC-based Code Signing



## CommScope PKI Center

Scalable, Secure Robust PKI infrastructure in production for 25+ years

Extensive real-world experience and expertise in handling security upgrades



## PQC Based Code Signing

Close collaborations with chip and HSM vendors implementing PQC-based code signing and encryption solutions

**PQC-based code signing is expected by Q4 2024**



## PQC Credential Provisioning

Both Factory and in-field provisioning of device credentials for OEMs/ODMs and service providers

**PQC-based device credential provisioning is expected by Q1 2025**

# Conclusions

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Ensuring the trustworthiness of software is pivotal in software supply chain security.

The increased number of sophisticated attacks on SSC, both internal and external, demand rigorous and proactive approaches to security. Code signing is one such approach.

Code signing is not just about the signing action. It's crucial to protect both the signing and verification keys, as well as to trace all actions with supporting evidence.

A versatile code-signing solution allows seamlessly integration into various IDEs, source code repositories, CI/CD pipelines, and other components of SSC.

The integrated code-signing solution by CommScope and JFrog is rigorous yet easy-to-use, enabling companies to build better and more secure products.



# Resources

<https://www.pki-center.com/partner/JFrog>  
<https://pki-center.com>

Xin (Shing) Qiu LinkedIn

